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The Burden of Proof in the Tax Court
By WM. SCHWVERDTFEGER*
It is well known to members of the bar that the number of
federal tax cases is greatly increasing, especially during the past
two years, and more and more petitions are being filed with the
Tax Court of the United States." This means that a growing num-
ber of attorneys are taking their tax disputes to court. But whether
the litigation is pursued to actual trial, whether only pleadings
are filed (and the matter settled out of court), or whether the
controversy is disposed of before proceedings are instituted, the
burden of proof question is important. Ability to settle a case
with representatives of the Internal Revenue Service2 often de-
pends, in part at least, upon which of the respective parties must
produce the evidence in the event of trial. A taxpayer's representa-
tive is at a disadvantage if he does not know the nature and
extent of his responsibility, not only at the hearing, but at con-
ferences preceding the hearing. Such knowledge is also important
in drafting the pleadings.
It is particularly material that the taxpayer's representative
appreciate where the burden of proof lies, since the employees of
the Commissioner who have settlement jurisdiction are, for the
most part, not lawyers, and not the ones who will assume trial
responsibilities.3 As a result, these officers are prone to rely on the
difficulty of the taxpayer's burden of proof without themselves
knowing whereof they speak.
* A.B., LL.B., University of Cincinnati. Practiced with the Bureau of In-
ternal Revenue, Penal and Appeals Divisions of Chief Counsel's Office. Member
of Ohio, Illinois and Kentucky Bars, and of Federal, and Kentucky and Louisville
Bar Associations. Address: Attorney-at-law, Kentucky Home Life Building, Louis-
ville 2, Kentucky.
' See "Taxes on Parade," April 1, 1953, published weekly by Commerce
Clearing House.
' The "Bureau of Internal Revenue" is no more. Its name has been officially
changed to "Internal Revenue Service." Treas. Dept. Order No. 150-29, 534 CCH,
Par. 3581.
'At the informal conference stage, the revenue agent and his group chief
(subject to review) have settlement jurisdiction. Reorganization Order No. 6., 534
CCH, Par. 3557. After the protest has been filed settlement jurisdiction lies with
the Appellate Division. Reorganization Order No. 2 (Revised), CCH, Federal
Estate and Gift Tax Reporter, Par. 8065. Neither the revenue agents, their group
chiefs, nor the technical advisors of the Appellate Division are legal officers or
required to be lawyers. In fact, relatively few of them are.
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It goes without saying that an understanding of the burden of
proof is important in the trial of the case. But the point is that the
average attorney, although he will not actually embark upon the
trial of a proceeding before the court, will be in a much better
position, if fortified with such understanding, to represent his
client in pre-trial negotiations.
The Tax Court
Before launching into the ramifications of this subject, it might
be well to discuss the Tax Court briefly. It is technically "an in-
dependent agency of the Executive Branch of the Government,"4
but functions as a court with much the same formality as a United
States district court sitting without a jury. Its jurisdiction is
limited to cases in which deficiencies in tax have been asserted by
the Commissioner, i.e., it cannot hear suits for refund,5 and only
deficiencies in income (including excess profits), estate and gift
taxes.6 There are sixteen judges,7 one of whom is selected as the
chief judge.8 From time to time during the year, the chief judge
selects one of the other members to hold a hearing calendar in one
of the principal cities of the country.9 In Kentucky the calendars
have so far been held only at Louisville.10 The judges have their
offices in 'Washington and visit the various cities only long enough
to hear the cases scheduled on the calendar. This normally takes
from one to two weeks.
If a determination made by the judge who hears the case is
considered by the chief judge to be of sufficient importance, it is
reviewed by the entire court." The litigants are not entitled to
trial by jury.12 The rules of evidence are those applicable in equity
proceedings in the courts of the District of Columbia prior to Sep-
tember 16, 1938.13
'Section 1100, Int. Rev. Code.
'Stanley A. Anderson, 11 T.C. 841 (1948); Julius Bendheim, 12 TCM 723
(1953).
' Section 1101, Int. Rev. Code.
'Section 1102, Int. Rev. Code.8Sectios 1101 and 1103(b), Int. Rev. Code.
9 Sections 1103(c) and 1105, Int. Rev. Code.
o See Appendix II to the Tax Court's Rules of Practice. The Rules of Practice
can be purchased from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.,
for fifteen cents.
z' Section 1118(b), Int. Rev. Code.
12 Section 1118(a), Int. Rev. Code.
"Section 1111, Int. Rev. Code. For details of procedure before the court,
see the court's Rules of Practice and "Procedure and Practice before the Tax
Court of the United States," Commerce Clearing House, thirteenth edition, 1953.
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With this background in mind let us examine the facets of
this topic.
The Taxpayer's Normal Burden
In the normal case, where the taxpayer is contesting a de-
ficiency determination and where one of the special circumstances
discussed below is not involved, it is he who has the burden of
proof.' 4 If the petitioner (the taxpayer) fails to produce evidence
in support of his position, the court will return a decision for the
Commissioner.15 This does not mean, however, that at the hearing
of a cause the taxpayer must be the one to produce the evidence.
The facts upon which the petitioner relies may be submitted by
the governmnent's attorney, or they may be contained in a joint
stipulation. 0 So long as there is sufficient material in the record,
the taxpayer will be considered to have sustained his burden.
In this same connection it should be noted that the disputed
question must first be placed in issue by the pleadings. If error is
not assigned in the petition to one of the adjustments proposed in
the Commissioner's notice of deficiency, the court will not render
a decision favorable to the taxpayer, no matter how much evidence
is adduced. 1 It was held in one case, however, that the refusal of
the Tax Court to consider an allegation of the statute of limita-
tions, although it had not been pleaded, was error where in their
opening statements counsel had indicated that it was an issue.' 8
The rule is the same as to any matters which the petitioner wishes
to raise other than the adjustments proposed in the deficiency
letter.' 9 For example, if insufficient depreciation is claimed on the
return, and if in the. deficiency -notice the amount of sales are said
to be understated and no mention is made of the depreiation, the
petitioner would have to allege error as to both the depreciation
and the sales.
What is the burden of proof? The Board of Tax Appeals (the
former name of the Tax Court) z held that it ."means -that he [the
"4Rule 32 of the court's Rules of Practice; Burnet v. Houston, 283 U.S. 223
(1931).
SRule 31 (g) of the court's Rules of Practice.
See rule 31(b) of the court's Rules of Practice for the provisions relative to
a stipulation.
'Dixie Mfg. Co., 1 B.T.A. 641 (1925); Steele-Wedeles Co. v. Com., 63 F.
2d 541 (C.A. 7, 1933).
"Cutcliffe v. Com., 163 F. 2d 891 (C.A. 5, 1947).
' Boggs and Buhl, Inc., v. Com., 34 F. 2d 859 (C.A. 3, 1929), affirning 11
B.T.A. 612 (1928).
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taxpayer] must introduce sufficient evidence to make a prima facie
showing that the Commissioner committed the errors alleged in
the petition and to overcome the proofs submitted on behalf of the
Commissioner. Such a showing must cover all the elements neces-
sary to establish the averments of the petition. ' 20 In practical ap-
plication there appears to be no difference between the burden
in the Tax Court and that in other courts where the plaintiff must
prevail by a preponderance of the proof.
Greater Quantum of Proof
In some instances the petitioner is required to produce a
greater quantum of evidence than normally required to overcome
the presumption of correctness which attaches to the Commis-
sioner's determination. For example, Congress has provided in
section 102 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code that, in ascertaining
the applicability of the tax imposed by that section, an accumula-
tion of earnings beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall
be determinative of the purpose to avoid surtax upon the share-
holders, "unless the corporation by the clear proponderance of the
evidence shall prove to the contrary." In subsection (b) of that
section it is further provided that, if the corporation is a mere
holding or investment company, that fact "shall be prima facie
evidence" of intent to avoid surtax. It is apparent that Congress
intended to impose a larger measure of proof in both instances
than is usually needed. The Treasury Department has in its regu-
lations interpreted these provisions to mean:
If the Commissioner determines that the corpora-
tion was formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding
the individual surtax through the' medium, of permitting
earnings or profits to accumulate, and the taxpayer contests
such determination of fact by litigation; the burden of prov-
ing the determination wrong by a preponderance of evi- -
dence, together with the corresponding burden of first going
forward with evidence, is on the taxpayer under principles
applicable to income tax cases generally, and that is so even
though the corporation is not a mere holding or investment
company and does not have an unreasonable accumulation
of earnings or profits. However, if the corporation is a mere
"J. M. Lyon, 1 B.T.A. 378 (1925). The same definition is set forth with
approval in Standard Marine Insurance Co. Ltd., 4 B.T.A. 853 (1926).
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holding or investment company, then the Internal Revenue
Code gives further weight to the presumption of correctness
already arising from the Commissioner's determination by
expressly providing an additional presumption of the exist-
ence of a purpose to avoid surtax upon shareholders, while
if earnings or profits are permitted to accumulate beyond
the reasonable needs of the business, then the Code adds
still more weight to the Commissioner's determination by
providing that irrespective of whether or not the corporation
is a mere holding or investment company, the existence of
such an accumulation is determinative of the purpose to
avoid surtax upon shareholders unless the taxpayer proves
the contrary by such a clear preponderance of all the evi-
dence that the absence of such a purpose is unmistakable.21
In the opinion of two writers, this paragraph of the regula-
tions is invalid,22 and the statutory provisions have a different
meaning:
In every tax case the mere assessment of a de-
ficiency is presumed to be correct until the taxpayer intro-
duces evidence tending to prove it otherwise. So in a Sec-
tion 102 case the corporation singled out must first produce
some evidence that the accumulated income was not for the
interdicted purpose. When the taxpayer has done this, the
burden of going forward with the case shifts to the Com-
missioner, and if he by his evidence is able to prove that the
taxpayer permitted its profits to accumulate beyond the
reasonable needs of the business, a presumption is then
established that the corporation has been "availed of" for the
purpose of preventing the imposition of surtaxes on its
shareholders. At this point in the trial the burden shifts
back to the taxpayer under the provision of Section 102(c)
that an unreasonable accumulation is determinative of the
purpose, "unless the corporation by the clear preponderance
of the evidence shall prove to the contrary."23
It seems, however, that this latter interpretation is incorrect.
By shifting the burden of going forward to the Commissioner,
after the corporation has introduced "some evidence," and requir-
ing him to prove that the profits were accumulated beyond the
reasonable needs of the business would place the taxpayer in a
more favored position than if Congress had employed no special
"1Section 39.102-2(b), Regulations 118.
' Buck and Shackelford, Retention of Earnings by Corporations, 36 VA. L.
R~v. 141, 178 (1950).
n Id. at 326-327.
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language. It is quite obvious that the legislature intended the
corporation to establish, to a degree greater than would other-
wise be required, that it was not being availed of to defeat the sur-
tax. Although pressing the requirement of proof to the point of
being "unmistakable" may be going a bit too far, it appears that
the regulations approach the question in the correct light.
"In the discretion of the Commissioner" a taxpayer may claim
as a deduction a reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts.
Or the Commissioner may allow as a deduction a partially bad
debt "when satisfied that [such] debt is recoverable only in part.
24
This has been interpreted to mean that the taxpayer must not
only establish that the addition to the reserve is reasonable, but
that, if the Commissioner chooses to disallow it, the decision is
not an abuse of his statutory discretion.2 5 The same rule is ap-
plicable to a debt only partly recoverable.
26
In instances where a decedent made lifetime transfers of a
substantial part of his property, other than by bona-fide sale,
within three years prior to his death, such conveyance is deemed
to have been made in contemplation of death (and hence taxable
as part of his estate) "unless shown to the contrary. '27 Hence
there is not only the ordinary presumption of correctness that at-
taches to the Commissioner's determination, but also a "statutory
presumption" that must be overcome. 28 It does not appear, how-
ever, that any greater degree of proof is necessary to overcome the
statutory presumption than would be required in the case of a
normal deficiency.20
Rule of the Cohan Case
It is a well established rule that deductions, including ordinary
and necessary expenses, are a matter of legislative grace, and are
to be allowed only where there is .clear provision therefor in the
' Section 23(k)(1), Int. Rev. Code.
' C. P. Ford and Co., 28 B.T.A. 156 (1933); Krim-Ko Corporation, 16 T.C.
31 (1951).
" Stranaban v. Corn., 42 F. 2d 729 (C.A. 6, 1930), cert. den. 283 U.S. 822.
'Section 811(c) and (1), Int. Rev. Code.
I Estates of Henry Monroe Springer, 45 B.T.A. 561 (1941); McClure v. Com.,
56 F. 2d 548 (C.A. 5, 1932), cert. den. 287 U.S. 609.
'Estate of Edwin W. Rickenberg, 11 T.C. 1 (1948), reversed on other
grounds 177 F. 2d 114 (1949), cert. den. 338 U.S. 449; Estate of Benjamin
Franklin McGrew, 46 B.T.A. 623 (1942), aff'd. 135 F. 2d 158 (1943).
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statute.30 But the strict interpretation of such provisions goes only
to the allowability, not to the amount. In the now famous Cohan
case,31 the well known actor, playwright, and producer claimed
large sums on his returns for alleged travel and entertainment.
He kept no record of such expenditures and gave no detailed
figures at the trial. The only proof presented was his testimony
that he traveled and entertained extensively, spending substantial
amounts for those purposes. The then Board of Tax Appeals dis-
allowed the claimed deductions on the ground that the taxpayer
had not carried his burden of proof. But the Second Circuit
reversed on this point saying that so long as there was a clear
indication that something was spent, the lower court could not
disallow the entire amount claimed. Recognizing that the record
presented not even a vague idea of what Cohan's actual expendi-
tures were, Judge Learned Hand in writing the opinion declared
that ". .. the Board should make as close an approximation as it
can, bearing heavily, if it chooses, upon the taxpayer whose in-
exactitude is of his own making, . . . if necessary by drawing upon
the Board's personal estimates of the minimum of such expenses."
The Tax Court, true to the injunction of the Cohan case, has
applied the rule in almost innumerable instances. Moreover, the
application has not been limited to travel and entertainment ex-
penses, or even to deductions generally, but has been extended to
such items as the amount of tips received by a taxi driver,32 the
extent of a wife's contribution to a partnership,33 the life of tank
cars for depreciation purposes,3 4 and even the amount of construc-
tive average base period net income.35
It is the writer's personal view that the substitution of the
opinion, or rather the guess, of the Board or the Tax Court for
evidence is a violation of the burden of proof requirement. To
permit a taxpayer to obtain a large or even a small part of the
deductions claimed on his return without requiring that he estab-
lish more than that he spent something for these purposes is to
abandon entirely one of the basic tests.
New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 484 (1983); McDonald v.
Com., 328 U.S. 57 (1944).
' Cohan v. Com., 39 F. 2d 540 (C.A. 2, 1930), reversing 11 B.T.A. 743
(1928) on the point under discussion.
' Roberts, et al., v. Com., 176 F. 2d 221 (C.A. 9, 1949).
, Max German, 2 T.C. 474 (1943).
U.S. Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Helvering, 137 F. 2d 511 (C.A. 2, 1943).
National Grinding Wheel Co., 8 T.C. 1278 (1947).
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From a practical standpoint, the rule seems to encourage lax-
ity in keeping records and irresponsibility in claiming expenses.
The individual who is meticulous in accounting for his outlays is
often penalized. He might well do better by using a vague esti-
mate when making out his return and relying upon the Cohan
case in the event it is audited by the Internal Revenue Service.
Some practitioners engage in the questionable practice of pur-
posely refraining from introducing evidence supporting the dol-
lar amount of a fraction of the claimed expenses. They feel, and
with considerable justification, that if they established the ex-
penditure of a relatively small part of the claimed deduction,
they would fare worse than if they showed none at all and urged
the application of the Cohan rule. The author feels that when it
comes to the point where a taxpayer is penalized for keeping
records and introducing evidence, the burden of proof rule be-
comes a nullity.
Theoretically, of course, the Tax Court could choose to "bear
heavily upon the taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his own mak-
ing." And there is no doubt but what, on occasion, the allowed
expenditures are less than the actual ones. But too often the tax-
payer "makes the inexactitude" because he knows that if he were
called upon to prove the deductions he has claimed he would have
to concede that they were not as large as reported. The travesty
is that the members of the court cannot with even the remotest
degree of accuracy approximate the business expenses of another,
and most certainly do not have the experience to know the life of
tank cars or the amount of the constructive average base period
net income of a business.3 6
Fraud Cases
So far we have examined only those instances in which the
burden of proof is on the petitioner. We now turn to the situa-
tions in which the Commissioner has the burden.
Probably the most important instance in which the burden is
on the respondent is where fraud is in issue. There are two events
in which the Commissioner must carry this obligation: first, for the
imposition of the fifty percent penalty; 37 and, second, for the ex-
'For a recent article on the Cohan rule, see Robert S. Holzman, "Round
Numbers are Always False," Taxes, June, 1952, p. 482.
'7 Section 293(b), Int. Rev. Code.
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ception to the statute of limitations barring assessment.38 Fre-
quently the government relies upon fraud for both purposes; that
is, to impose upon the taxpayer an addition to the tax and to
assert the tax even though the three (or sometimes five) year
period has elapsed.
It is essential that the fraud be alleged by the respondent in
his answer.3 9 Failure to do so results in no issue on that point,
with the result that the fifty percent penalty will not be imposed
and the statute of limitations will not be set aside. If the answer
does contain such allegations, or any facts upon which the Com-
missioner relies for affirmative relief, the petitioner must file a
reply.40 But, if no reply is filed within the time prescribed, the
allegations of the answer will not be deemed to be admitted unless
the court grants a motion by the respondent to that effect. Before
passing on the motion the court will serve a copy on the taxpayer
and issue an order to show cause.4 1 In practice, the petitioner's
attorney may then file the reply, even though untimely.
Not only is the alleged fraud never to be presumed, but it
must be established by clear and convincing evidence, rather than
by mere preponderance. 42 But, as in the instance of the taxpayer's
burden in non-fraud cases, the Commissioner is not limited to
evidence he has affirmatively introduced, but may discharge his
responsibility by reference to the entire record.43 But fraud can-
not be established by mere understatement of income, however
large; the Commissioner must show bad faith, intentional wrong-
doing and a sinister motive.
44
The fact that the respondent has the burden on the issue of
fraud does not relieve or alter the petitioner's obligation as to the
amount of tax due. This is true for all years, even those barred by
the statute of limitations in the absence of fraud. Hence, except
in the rather unusual instance where the taxpayer concedes the
correctness of the proposed deficiency in tax for all years, both the
petitioner and the respondent have an obligation in fraud cases;
the taxpayer to rebut the presumption of correctness attaching
," Section 276(a), Int. Rev. Code.
Rule 14 of the court's Rules of Practice.
Rule 15 of the court's Rules of Practice.Rule 18 of the court's Rules of Practice.
Charles Heiss, 36 B.T.A. 833 (1937).
UL. Schepp Co., 25 B.T.A. 419 (1932).
"L. Glenn Switzer, 20 T.C. -, No. 110 (1953).
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to the determination of tax due, the respondent to establish fraud.
This dual burden at times raises questions of procedure at the
hearing. Each side may insist that the other go first. If the parties
cannot agree, the court will have to resolve the conflict.
The burden is on the Commissioner only as to the penalty for
fraud. It is incumbent upon the taxpayer to disprove the cor-
rectness of other types of penalties, such as those for negligence,4
delinquency, 46 and understatement of estimated tax.
47
Affirmative Issues
Another instance in which the Commissioner must shoulder
the burden of proof is where he sets forth new issues in the answer.
The presumption of correctness attaches to only such matters as
are contained in the deficiency notice. If the respondent discovers
another item omitted from, or incorrectly reported on, the return
after the statutory letter has been issued, he may assert it ab initio
in the answer, either as originally filed, or upon leave of Court,
as amended. The assertion may not be made after the hearing is
concluded, and normally leave to amend will not be granted unless
the motion is made sufficiently long before the trial to afford the
taxpayer an opportunity to meet the new issue. Upon asserting the
added matter, the burden of sustaining it is upon the Commis-
sioner.4 If the new issue results in additional tax liability, it may
be asserted at the same time.49
Statute of Limitations
As already indicated, if the Internal Revenue Service is relying
upon fraud as the ground for proposing a deficiency for a year
which would otherwise be outlawed by the statute of limitations,
the Commissioner must establish the fraud. It is also true that, if
the Commissioner is relying upon the so called five year statute, 0
he must allege and demonstrate its applicability. The burden is
upon the respondent to show that more than twenty-five percent
'Section 293(a), Int. Rev. Code; Gibbs & Hudson, Inc., 35 B.T.A. 205
(1936).
" Section 291, Int. Rev. Code; Charles C. Rice, 14 T.C. 503 (1950).
' Section 294(d), Int. Rev. Code; W. A. Berdine, 12 TCM 324 (1953).
" Rule 32 of the court's Rules of Practice.
"Section 272(e), Int. Rev. Code.
"Section 275(c), Int. Rev, Code.
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of the gross income has been omitted in the return filed for the
year in question.5 1
As to the normal three year period for assessing a deficiency in
tax, -5 2 the taxpayer must in his petition assert the statute. If the
Commissioner in his answer admits the dates upon which the re-
turn was filed and the deficiency notice issued, and if the inter-
vening period is more than three years, the burden is on the
respondent to allege and prove an exception to the statute (e.g.,
waivers extending the assessment period). The burden is not on
the taxpayer to disprove, under such circumstances, the existence
of the exceptions to the three year statutory period.5 3 If the
petitioner raises the defense of the statute, and if the Commis-
sioner does not admit the correctness of the dates or otherwise
concede that more than three years have elapsed between the
filing of the return and the issuance of the notice, the taxpayer
must establish the expiration of such period. When he does, the
burden shifts to the government to disprove the prima facie case.
The Commissioner's burden is discharged by the introduction of
a waiver, valid on its face, agreeing to the extension of the period
to a date beyond the day on which the notice of deficiency was
mailed.5 4 It is then incumbent upon the taxpayer to demonstrate,
if he can, that such consent is invalid.
Transferee Liability
Another instance in which the burden reposes upon the gov-
ernment is in the case of transferee liability. But the burden
extends only to the establishment of the obligation of the person
receiving property, not to the amount of tax owed by the trans-
feror-taxpayer.r5 The taxpayer need not be a party to such a pro-
ceeding since an action against him may be futile, he no longer
having assets subject to distraint.5 6
If the transferee's defense, in whole or in part, is that the
mC. A. Reis, 1 T.C. 9 (1942), and the same case on rehearing, 2 TCM 216
(1943), affid 142 F. 2d 900 (1944).' Section 275(a), Int. Rev. Code.
' Farmers Feed Co., 10 B.T.A. 1069 (1928); Bonwit Teller & Co., 10 B.T.A.
1300 (1928); Estate of J. B. Williams, 12 TCM 829 (1953).
' Concrete Engineering Co., 19 B.T.A. 212 (1980), aff'd. 58 F. 2d 566 (C.A.
8, 1932).
'Section 1119(a), Int. Rev. Code.
SSamuel Wilcox, 16 T.C. 572 (1951); Estate of Irving Smith, 16 T.C. 807
(1951).
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transferor does not in fact owe the tax, or at least not so much as
the Commissioner has asserted, the petitioner-transferee may ob-
tain permission of the court to examine the taxpayer's books, rec-
ords, and other documents in order to prepare his case.57
In income tax cases, the Commissioner must demonstrate that
the petitioner received property from the taxpayer, the value of
such property, that the transfer took place after the tax liability
arose, that the conveyance was without adequate consideration,
that the transferor was insolvent either at the time of the gift or
as a result of it, and that the tax has not been paid.58 In the case
of estate or gift taxes, however, the government need establish only
a gratuitous transfer, the value of the property conveyed, and that
the liability has not already been satisfied.59
Rule of the Taylor Case
At times the taxpayer attempts to shift his burden of proof in
ordinary deficiency cases to the respondent. This can be done suc-
cessfully if he can demonstrate that the Commissioner's de-
termination is "without rational foundation." The Supreme
Court announced in Helvering v. Taylor 0 that "we find nothing
in the statutes, the rules of the board or our decisions that gives
any support to the idea that the Commissioner's determination
shown to be without rational foundation and excessive will be en-
forced unless the taxpayer proves he owes nothing, or, if liable at
all, shows the correct amount." This principle is cited in many
instances accompanied by vigorous argument that the deficiency
should be set aside. But, too often, the contention is not of great
merit because petitioner's counsel has overlooked the further re-
quirement of the rule that: "Unquestionably the burden of proof
is on the taxpayer to show that the Commissioner's determination
is invalid."' In other words the petitioner cannot invoke the
precedent of that case without demonstrating by proof, and not
mere argument, the arbitrary or baseless method of computing
additional income used by the Service. But if such proof is intro-
' Section 1119(b), Int. Rev. Code.
'Section 311(a), Int. Rev. Code; Annie Temoyan, et al., 16 B.T.A. 923
(1929); Ludwig Vogelstein, 16 B.T.A. 947 (1929); American Feature Film Co.,
24 B.T.A. 18 (1931); Mrs. Lefferts Knox, 2 TCM 653 (1943).
' Sections 827(b) (estate tax), and 1009 (gift tax), lnt. Rev. Code.
293 U.S. 507 (1935).
Helvering v. Taylor, supra.
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duced, he can effectively transfer the burden from his shoulders to
those of the Commissioner.6
2
Rule of the Gowran Case
It does not necessarily follow from the Taylor opinion, how-
ever, that the burden shifts to the respondent simply because the
Commissioner predicates his position at the trial or in his brief
upon a theory or premise different from that set forth in the
deficiency notice. Similarly, the obligation has been held to re-
main with the taxpayer even though the respondent bases his
position throughout upon an unsound foundation. The Supreme
Court in Helvering v. Gowran63 declared that: "If the Commis-
sioner was right in his determination, the Board properly affirmed
it, even if the reasons which he had assigned were wrong." This
reflects the attitude which the Board had applied in cases prior to
the Gowran decision.
*.. the Board has consistently held that the sub-
ject matter of the proceeding before it is the tax liability of
the petitioner. When a deficiency is determined, the reasons
given do not constitute or confine the issues .... The pri-
mary issue is the correctness of the ultimate determination
of deficiency, and the ordinary presumption is not destroyed
by the reason given, even if it be unsound or badly ex-
pressed.
64
Perhaps we can disregard certain holdings to the contrary,65 as
having been decided prior to the Gowran case; moreover, other
opinions since that time have followed the Gowran rule.6 6 But
even since then, in a sizeable number of cases, the court seems to
have deviated from that principle without reference to the Gowran
uSee Ross Bowman, 17 T.C. 681 (1951); W. L. Harris, 7 TCM 820 (1948).
302 U.S. 238 (1937).
"James P. Gossett, 22 B.T.A. 1279 (1931), aff'd. 59 F. 2d 365 (C.A. 4,
1932). See also Edgar M. Camrick, 21 B.T.A. 12 (1930); Alexander Sprunt &
Son, Inc., 24 B.T.A. 599 (1931), aff'd. on this point, 64 F. 2d 424 (C.A. 4,
1933); John I. Chipley, 25 B.T.A. 1103 (1932); Charles J. O'Laughlin, 80 B.T.A.
1327 (1934), aff'd. 81 F. 2d 269 (C.A. D.C., 1936).
' Clinton Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Com., 78 F. 2d 292 (C.A. 4, 1935); Robert C.
Coffey, 21 B.T.A. 1242 (1931).
"Raoul H. Fleischmann, 40 B.T.A. 672 (1939); Standard Oil Co., 43 B.T.A.
973 (1941), affd. 129 F. 2d 363 (C.A. 7, 1942), cert. den. 317 U.S. 688; Leopold
Spingarn, 7 TCM 498 (1948); Bard-Parker Company, Inc., 18 T.C. 1255 (1952),
on appeal (C.A. 2).
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decision or to the many opinions which are to the same effect.67
In Vincent C. Campbell,8 for example, it was stated without cita-
tion of authority:
The Commissioner in his brief attempts to argue
matters inconsistent with his own determination as disclosed
in the deficiency notices. He may not do that under the
rules of the Court without affirmative pleadings on his part.
It must be recognized, for the purpose of this proceeding,
that the petitioners actually loaned the money to the Camp-
bell Bros. Coal Co. of Akron, in the amounts claimed in
their returns and those amounts became worthless during
1944, because those facts are not only consistent with, but
are essential to, the determination made by the Commis-
sioner. The petitioners have properly deemed those matters
not in dispute.
The court did not specify what the "inconsistent matters" were
that respondent argued in his brief, but it is informally under-
stood he was contending that there were no bona fide loans made.
If that is true, it would seem that under the Gowran principle, the
Commissioner without affirmative pleading or assuming the bur-
den of proof, should not only be allowed to make that claim (even
though it should be considered inconsistent), but if correct should
be sustained.
In the Gowran case it was stated that, since the taxpayer might
be prejudiced by the adoption of the "new issue presented," leave
was granted him to apply to the Board for the privilege of intro-
ducing new evidence which would affect the result. 9
In one case, distinguishable from the Gowran line of decisions,
it was held that, where the Commissioner substitutes a larger
amount for that originally set forth, employing a different theory
and claiming an increased deficiency, he has abandoned his origi-
nal position, the presumption of correctness attaching to it dis-
solves, and the burden of proof shifts to him.7° In another in-
" Warner G. Baird, 42 B.T.A. 970 (1940); Maltine Co., 5 T.C. 1265 (1945);
Wentworth Manufacturing Co., 6 T.C. 1201 (1946); Vincent C. Campbell, 11
T.C. 510 (1948); O.D. Bratton, 12 TCM 747 (1953). The court withdrew the
Bratton decision on the Commissioner's motion for reconsideration and has re-
issued it without reference to the burden of proof question. 12 TCM 747 (1953).
11 T.C. 510 (1948).
Helvering v. Gowran, supra. See also Raoul H. Fleischmann, 40 B.T.A.
672 (1939).
. Seaside Improvement Co. v. Com., 105 F. 2d 990 (C.A. 2, 1939), cert. den.
308 U.S. 618.
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stance, where the government set forth one interpretation of the
statute in its regulations, and adopted that interpretation in its
deficiency notice, argument before the Board and circuit court,
and its request for certiorari, the Supreme Court refused to con-
sider a contention based upon a wholly contrary and opposite con-
struction.
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It has also been held that, upon rehearing in the Tax Court
pursuant to remand from the Circuit Court of Appeals, the burden
of proof remains with the taxpayer even though the deficiency in




In hearings before the Tax Court, the taxpayer-petitioner gen-
erally has the burden of disproving, by prima facie evidence, the
presumption of correctness which attaches to the Commissioner's
determination. In some instances, such as with regard to the tax
imposed by section 102 and an addition to the reserve for bad
debts, the quantum of his proof must be greater than in ordinary
deficiency cases. In those situations where the taxpayer's testimony
shows that some allowable expenditures have been made, but the
amount has not been demonstrated, the court will make as close
an approximation as it can.
Where fraud is in issue, either because of an attempt by the
government to assert an addition to the tax or an exception to the
statute of limitations, or both, the burden not only is upon the
Commissioner, but he must discharge that responsibility by clear
and convincing evidence. As to types of penalties other than fraud,
the petitioner has the burden of proceeding as though the penal-
ties were a part of the tax. The respondent also has the obligation
in instances where he raises affirmative issues in his answer which
are not contained in the deficiency notice, or in cases of transferee
liability. But here he need sustain his position only by the normal
preponderance of the proof. The Commissioner has a similar re-
sponsibility with regard to the five year statute of limitations, and
even with regard to the three year statute, if the pleadings establish
that more than three years have elapsed between the time the
Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481 (1936).
Stock Yards Nat. Bk. of South St. Paul v. Corn., 169 F. 2d 39 (C.A. 8, 1948).
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return was filed and the deficiency notice issued. The petitioner
need not prove the exceptions to the statute, but he must prove
the invalidity of a consent valid on its face.
A taxpayer may shift his normal burden to the Commissioner
if he establishes that the latter's-determination is "without rational
foundation." In other words, the petitioner need not show the
correctness of his own position to transfer the obligation, he need
demonstrate only the arbitrary or baseless resolve of his adversary.
This does not mean, however, at least according to one line of
decisions, that, merely because the respondent adopts or urges a
theory or principle different from, or even contrary to, that given
as the reason for an adjustment in the deficiency notice, the pre-
sumption of correctness no longer attaches to the adjustment. But
if the amount of the adjustment were increased on a new theory
and a greater deficiency claimed the presumption would disappear.
As the number of tax cases increases, and as more of them are
carried to the litigation stage, an understanding of the various
aspects of the burden of proof question becomes increasingly im-
portant to those who represent the tax-paying public.
